Remote Code Roulette: HT Contact Form Plugin Fails the Upload Test

How One File Upload Bug Could Burn Down Your WordPress Site

Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution File Upload Abuse

WordPress plugins often promise drag-and-drop magic, but the HT Contact Form Widget delivered something else entirely—unauthenticated file uploads that could lead to full server compromise. In the latest disclosure, attackers can inject malicious code via the `temp_file_upload` function, exploiting a total lack of file type validation. But with BitFire’s WAF and RASP working in tandem, this kind of exploit doesn’t get past the gate, let alone inside your source code.

View CVE Report: CVE-2025-7340

View On WordPress.org: ht-contactform

View On Trac: plugins.trac.wordpress.org

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HT Contact Form Widget For Elementor Page Builder & Gutenberg Blocks & Form Builder.

"This plugin allows users to quickly create contact forms using Elementor, Gutenberg, and a drag-and-drop form builder. It promises an intuitive UI for custom forms, file attachments, and responsive design without code."

-- ht-contactform

• Create contact forms using Gutenberg or Elementor
• Drag-and-drop form builder interface
• Supports file uploads and email notifications
• Shortcode and widget-based deployment options

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The Gory Details

In versions up to and including 2.2.1 of the HT Contact Form Widget, the `temp_file_upload` function allows unauthenticated users to upload arbitrary files to the server. There is no validation of file extensions or MIME types, meaning attackers can upload `.php` shells or other malicious payloads. Once uploaded, these files can be executed remotely—opening the door to full server compromise, database extraction, or lateral movement across the hosting account.

Mitigating the Risk

Developers patched this in version 2.2.2 by adding file type and extension validation, but not before attackers had ample opportunity to exploit the flaw. This isn’t the kind of mistake that’s easy to overlook—it’s a failure in fundamental input sanitization. If you’re running a vulnerable version, update immediately—and consider scanning your `wp-content/uploads` folder for suspicious `.php` or `.phtml` files.

Why BitFire?

BitFire’s dual-layer protection blocks this threat at multiple levels. First, its WAF engine inspects incoming file uploads for dangerous types, even if obfuscated. Second, its PRO RASP feature prevents runtime access to write or modify executable PHP files. Even if an attacker finds a way to upload a shell, BitFire’s hardened runtime makes sure that file cannot be executed, modified, or used to tamper with other code. In short: upload denied, code locked down.

The Bottom Line

This CVE is a textbook example of why you can't blindly trust plugins with upload features—especially ones that skip authentication. Arbitrary file upload is among the most dangerous vulnerabilities in the web application threat model. With BitFire guarding the gate, attackers won’t get the chance to write—or worse, execute—unauthorized PHP code. Whether you’re running a blog or an enterprise-grade WordPress stack, this is the kind of proactive defense that pays for itself with every blocked exploit.